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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-SELECTIVE SERVICE-RECLASSIFICATION
OF REGISTRANT WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE HELD DENIAL OF DUE
PRoCEss.-Registrant had been given a classification of "conscientious
objector" on eight different occasions, even though the board knew
he had participated in a college reserve officers' training program.
Acting on a Department of Justice report stating that registrant's
conscientious objection was not in good faith and recommending re-
classification, the board revoked his deferment. In a criminal prose-
cution for refusing to submit to induction, the Court held that, in the
absence of new evidence, there was a lack of fairness amounting to a
denial of due process in the board's consideration of the recommenda-
tion. Manke v. United States, 259 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958).
Tjae Universal Military Training and Service Act provides that
decisions of the local boards are final.1 The object of Congress in
providing for this administrative finality is the assurance to the con-
scription process of the speed which the urgency of the situation may
demand.2 Therefore it is not surprising that the strictness with which
the courts have interpreted the provision appears to have varied with
the degree of danger confronting the nation at the time.'
The courts early recognized a right of review by writ of habeas
corpus after induction upon proof that the investigation had not been
fair or where the finding of the board was contrary to all substantial
evidence.4 However, the question of whether to allow a registrant
to challenge the decision of the board as a defense in a criminal action
for refusal to submit to induction was more difficult to resolve..
In the leading case of Estep v. United States,5 the United States
Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to submit to induction
to be deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies, 6 and
having exhausted the procedures prescribed by the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, improper classification is a good defense
where the local boards lacked jurisdiction.7 But the question of
'62 Stat. 620 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1952).
2 See Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944).
3 See DAVIs, ADmINISTRATIV LAW § 238, at 835-36 (1951).
4 Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 Fed. 441 (4th Cir. "1919); United States v.
Powell, 38 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.J. 1941). The propriety of this method of
review was assumed in Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946).
t327 U.S. 114 (1946).
6 "Submission to induction would be satisfaction of the orders of the local
boards, not a further step to obtain relief from them." Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 123 (1946).
7 Estep v. United States, supra note 6.
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jurisdiction, it was held, is reached only where there is no basis in
fact 8 for the board's decision.
Simultaneously, the courts began to introduce the constitutional
due process doctrine to support reversals of draft board decisions.
Thus it was held that a registrant is entitled to a copy of the recom-
mendation made by the Department of Justice 9 and to a fair r~sum6
of the facts on which the recommendation was based,10 so that he may
defend himself.
A third group of decisions seems to rest on a combination of
the theories of "denial of due process" and "no basis in fact." "
In United States v. Everngam' 2 the court held that where the hear-
ing officer had based his recommendation on his own interpretation
of the tenets of the registrant's religion, he had used an improper
test which amounted to a denial of due process. 1 3  In United States
v. Cain,14 it was held that, while it is proper for a board to seek
advice on a question incidental to a registrant's classification, it is a
denial of due process for a board to abdicate its function by permit-
ting a panel of experts to decide the sincerity of the registrant's
claim. 15
The principal case, Manke v. United States,'6 is probably most
accurately classified as belonging to this third category of cases. It
is distinguishable from this group, however, in that here the court
expressly stated that there was a basis in fact for refusing the classi-
fication, since the registrant had participated in a reserve officers'
training program.17 But there is a similarity in that, while there
would have been a basis in fact had the board initially refused the
deferment, it might be said that there was no basis.for retracting the
deferment once it had been decided that the facts warranted the
classification. An analogy might be drawn to the Cain case.' 8  In
Cain a panel was allowed to make a decision which the board
itself should have made; here, the Department of Justice, whose func-
3 Id. at 122-23.
9Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).1o United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953). "A fair r6sum6 is one
which will permit the registrant to defend against the adverse evidence-to
explain it, rebut it, or otherwise detract from its damaging force." Simmons
v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 405 (1955).
"In these cases the courts held that the boards had denied the defendants
due process by relying on improper grounds for their decisions, but intimated
that, had the Government been able to offer some other bases for the classifi-
cations, their decisions would have been final.
12 102 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.W. Va. 1951).
-United States v. Everngam, 102 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.W. Va. 1951).
14149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945).
IGUnited States v. Cain, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945).
16259 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958).
'1 Manke v. United States, 259 F.2d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
1s United States v. Cain, supra note 15.
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tion in this process is a purely advisory one,1 was apparently per-
mitted to do the same thing.
The case seems to apply a new concept of finality to board de-
cisions, making them irreversible even by the boards themselves
without new evidence. While this seems a radical departure from
the laissez faire attitude with which the courts have viewed the con-
scription process in the past,20 the burden placed on the boards does
not seem an unreasonable one. It is a basic principle that a defer-
ment is to be granted only when, under the unusual circumstances
present, the registrant clearly establishes his right to it.21  If it is
conceded that there are such circumstances present, it seems only
reasonable that the same facts cannot support a reversal by which
the board denies the deferment.
There is, however, the danger that the boards would react to
such an imposition of finality by arbitrarily refusing to grant a de-
ferment in the first instance, thus securing for themselves the advan-
tage of the Department of Justice's recommendation before making
a final decision.22  In that event, the effect would be precisely what
the courts have tried to avoid-an abdication by the board of its
function, permitting the Department of Justice alone to all but classify
the registrants.
ANTITRUST- RELEVANT MARKET OF CHAMPIONSHIP BOUTS
DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL PROFESSIONAL BOXING CONTESTS.-Defen-
dants were engaged in the promotion of professional boxing matches
in the United States. The Government in bringing this action al-
leged violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act I in that
19 Exec. Order No. 10363, 17 Fed. Reg. 5456 (1952).
20 For a review of the limitations placed on judicial review of draft board
decisions, see concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 134 (1946).
21 "It must be observed ... that we are dealing with an exemption, and
that under familiar rules of statutory construction, the appellant must bring
himself clearly within the exempted class." Rase v. United States, 129 F.2d
204, 207 (1942).
22 The Department of Justice inquiry is made only when a registrant ap-
peals from a denial of the conscientious objector classification. Thus, where
a board desires a more thorough exposition of the facts before making a final
decision, the simple expedient would be to refuse the classification and allow
the registrant to appeal.
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
"SECTION 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ....
"SEc. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
